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This Essay explores the largely overlooked relationship between 
claim construction and patent assertion entities (patent “trolls”), finding 
that claim construction problems and trends benefit patent assertion 
entities.  First, the Federal Circuit is deeply divided as to the proper 
approach to claim construction. This split is a significant contributor to 
uncertain patent scope, which is widely-recognized as a core reason for the 
rise and success of patent assertion entities.  Second, case law and 
commentary increasingly endorse an approach to claim construction that 
relies on the “general meaning” in the technical field with limited reliance 
on the patent itself. This approach increases the breadth and uncertainty of 
patent scope, the exact conditions under which patent assertion entities 
thrive. Third, the Supreme Court’s recent adoption of a more deferential 
standard of review for claim construction in Teva v. Sandoz is widely 
praised. However, because patent assertion entities file in favorable district 
courts, like the Eastern District of Texas, deferential review increases both 
the benefits patent assertion entities receive from favorable districts and 
their incentive to file in those districts.  
If patent assertion entities are as problematic as widely thought, 
these claim construction problems and trends warrant reconsideration. 
Some may argue that current claim construction rules and trends are 
warranted despite their positive impact on patent assertion entities.  And 
other means may exist for combatting patent assertion entities without 
altering claim construction rules or trends.  But the positive effects for 
patent assertion entities must at least be factored into any cost-benefit 
analysis of claim construction rules.  Moreover, the fact that current claim 
construction rules and trends produce the conditions under which patent 
assertion entities thrive suggest that patent assertion entities may be a 
symptom of larger problems with claim construction doctrine.   
* Assistant Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; Visiting Faculty,
Chicago-Kent College of Law (Fall 2015). Thanks to Rebecca Eisenberg, Janet Freilich, 
Chris Funk, John Golden, Lisa Ouellette, and participants at the 2015 Intellectual 
Property Scholars Conference at DePaul College of Law for helpful discussions and 
comments on this and earlier versions of the project.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent claim construction – the interpretation of the short 
paragraphs (or “claims”) at the end of the patent that define the scope of 
the patentee’s rights – is “overwhelmingly the most critical patent issue in 
litigation.”1  It is also one of the most problematic and controversial.  
“Debates over whether the fundamental inquiry of patent law is broken, 
and what to do if it is, engross not only observers of the patent system, but 
also the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the 
appellate court entrusted with the control of patent law.”2 
Patent assertion entities – also known as non-practicing entities or, 
more pejoratively, patent “trolls”3 – are also one of the most important, 
controversial, and arguably problematic issues in modern patent litigation. 
The debate over patent assertion entities has divided academics,4 led 
Congress to debate major patent reform for the second time in less than 
five years,5 and even caught the attention of the popular media, including 
an eleven minute segment on John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight.6 
Yet, the intersection of what are two of the most important, 
controversial, and problematic aspects of modern patent litigation has been 
largely overlooked.  Unexplored are the related questions of how claim 
construction has contributed to the rise and/or viability of patent assertion 
entities and what concerns about patent assertion entities mean for the 
claim construction debates.  Frankly, this is surprising.  Problems with 
1 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?  Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, __ (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).   
2 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of 
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1033 (2007). 
3 The terms patent assertion entity (“PAE”), non-practicing entity (“NPE”), and 
patent troll (“troll”) have different connotations but are often used interchangeably.  See 
David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the 
Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2014).  
4 Compare Letter to Congress by 51 Legal and Economics Scholars Who Study 
Innovation, Intellectual Property Law, and Policy (Mar. 2, 2015), available at 
http://www.utdallas.edu/~ugg041000/IPScholarsLettertoCongress_March_2_2015.pdf 
(“PAE litigation has been costing firms tens of billions of dollars per year since 2007.”), 
with Letter to Congress by 40 Economists and Law Professors Who Conduct Research 
in Patent Law and Policy (Mar. 10, 2015), available at http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Economists-Law-Profs-Letter-re-Patent-Reform.pdf (“[M]uch of 
the information surrounding the patent policy discussion, and in particular the 
discussion of so-called “patent trolls,” is either inaccurate or does not support the 
conclusions for which it is cited.”).  
5 See Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform with Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (providing overview of current patent reform efforts); see 
also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2012). 
6 Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents (HBO) (Apr. 19, 2015), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bxcc3SM_KA.  
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patent scope – both uncertainty and overbreadth of patent scope – are 
frequently identified as contributing to the rise and success of patent 
assertion entities.7  And “claim construction is fundamental to determining 
a patent’s scope.”8  The potential link between claim construction and 
patent assertion entities is, well, patent. 
This Essay tackles the overlooked connection between patent 
assertion entities and claim construction.  In broad strokes, the Essay 
develops three major themes.  First, problems with claim construction are 
significant contributors to the uncertainty and breadth of claim scope, 
which fuel patent assertion entities.  Second, current trends in claim 
construction, both in the courts and the academy, will benefit patent 
assertion entities.  Third, the problems and trends in claim construction 
undermine other efforts to combat patent assertion entities by making it 
easier for patent assertion entities to assert a non-frivolous litigation 
position supportable under current law. 
More specifically, an outcome-determinative split within the 
Federal Circuit as to the proper approach to claim construction creates 
significant uncertainty about claim scope that cannot be resolved without 
litigation.9  Uncertain claim scope is widely seen as fueling patent 
assertion entities.  Yet, courts and commentators are increasingly ignoring 
or downplaying the claim construction split when discussing patent notice 
problems.  Some even suggest, contrary to empirical evidence, that the split 
has been resolved.10  
Second, a claim construction approach that emphasizes the general 
meaning in the technical field and permits only limited resort to the 
disclosure in the patent itself continues to garner precedential and 
scholarly support.  This approach undermines ex ante predictability of 
claim scope because it depends on testimony of expert witnesses and other 
evidence created or identified by the parties ex post in litigation, rather 
than on the publicly-available and static patent document.  Moreover, even 
its proponents acknowledge that it produces broader claim scope. 
Uncertain and broad claim scope are conditions in which patent assertion 
entities thrive, and, unsurprisingly, they tend to rely on the general 
meaning line of cases.11  Yet, even as general trends in patent law seek to 
constrain patent assertion entities, case law and scholars increasingly 
7 James Bessen, The patent troll crisis is really a software patent crisis, 
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-troll-crisis-is-really-a-software-patent-crisis/. 
8 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of 
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2007). 
9 See Part II.A.1, infra. 
10 See Part II.A.2, infra. 
11 See Part II.B.1, infra. 
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endorse the general meaning claim construction approach.12  
Finally, the standard of appellate review for claim construction has 
long been the focal point of claim construction debates, with widespread 
calls in the academy and the bar for more deferential review.  The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Teva v. Sandoz heeded those calls, rejecting the 
Federal Circuit’s de novo standard and providing greater deference to 
district court claim constructions.  Teva largely has been lauded by the 
patent community, even though it is likely to help patent assertion 
entities.13  After Teva, district judges have incentives to place greater 
reliance on expert evidence and other external evidence, and less reliance 
on the patent document itself, which will tend to create broader claims and 
greater uncertainty.  Moreover, patent assertion entities overwhelmingly 
file in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which tends 
to favor patentees in a variety of ways, likely including claim construction.  
More deferential review means more power for district courts, which 
accentuates patent assertion entities’ advantage from choosing the forum 
and incentivizes districts that cater to patent assertion entities to adopt 
pro-patentee claim constructions.14   
Having described the connection between claim construction 
problems and trends and patent assertion entities, the obvious question is 
what does it all mean?  For those untroubled by patent assertion entities, 
perhaps not much.  But for the majority of the patent community that 
worries, to varying extents, about the consequences of patent assertion 
entities for innovation, competition, and patent litigation, this Essay 
suggests that the current direction of claim construction is far from 
optimal.15  Claim construction trends also indirectly undermine other 
efforts to combat patent assertion entities.  A variety of current proposals – 
pleading standards, Rule 11 sanctions, fee shifting – attempt to punish 
patent assertion entities for bringing frivolous, meritless, or weak claims. 
However, the uncertainty and breadth of potential claim scope created by 
the claim construction issues addressed in this Essay make it easier for a 
patent assertion entity to identify a reasonable litigation position, 
undermining efforts to weed out claims based on their merits.16 
Of course, there may be ways to address patent assertion entities 
without altering the direction of claim construction, such as venue reform, 
restricting functional claiming, or improving patent examination.  And 
some may believe that current claim construction rules and trends are 
warranted despite (or except for) their effect on patent assertion entities. 
12 See Part II.B.2, infra. 
13 See Part II.C.2, infra. 
14 See Part II.C.1, infra. 
15 See Part III.A, infra. 
16 See Part III.B, infra. 
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At the very least, however, claim construction should be part of the patent 
assertion entity debate and the consequences for patent assertion entities 
should be part of the claim construction debates.17  Moreover, the fact that 
current claim construction rules and trends produce the conditions in 
which patent assertion entities thrive suggests that patent assertion 
entities may be a symptom that reveals underlying problems with claim 
construction doctrine.18 
Interestingly, and perhaps unsurprisingly, while courts, scholars, 
and most other commentators have overlooked the relationship between 
claim construction and patent assertion entities, the most popular targets 
for patent assertion entities – large technology companies like Google, 
Amazon.com, Yahoo!, Dell, and Twitter – have not.  In amicus briefs in the 
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court, these companies reached conclusions 
similar to this Essay: the claim construction split results in uncertain 
patent scope; a patent-focused approach better promotes public notice than 
the “general meaning” approach; and deferential appellate review 
undermines public notice and benefits patent holders.19  These technology 
companies were clearly motivated by their experience with patent assertion 
entities, though they left the link largely implicit.20  This Essay makes that 
link explicit. 
 Part I provides an overview of the parallel debates over patent 
assertion entities and claim construction.  Part II draws the connections 
between claim construction and patent assertion entities.  Part III 
evaluates the consequences of these connections.  A short conclusion 
follows. 
I.  PATENT LITIGATION PROBLEMS:  “TROLLS” AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
Patent assertion entities and claim construction have been two of 
the most discussed and debated topics in patent law since the turn of this 
century, probably only rivaled or surpassed by patentable subject matter 
17 See Part III.A, infra. 
18 Mark A. Lemley & Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forests for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121 (2013) (“Patent trolls alone are not the problem; they are a 
symptom of larger problems with the patent system. . . . Exposing the larger problems 
allows us to contemplate changes in patent law that will actually tackle the underlying 
pathologies of the patent system and the abusive conduct they enable.”). 
19 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 20-22, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) (joined by Google, Dell, 
HP, Salesforce.com, Twitter, Yahoo!, Acushnet, eBay, Kaspersky Lab, Limelight 
Networks, Newegg, QVC, SAS Institute, and Xilink); Brief of Google Inc. et al. as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant 24-25 & n.3, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. 
Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (joined by Google, 
Amazon, HP, Red Hat, and Yahoo!). 
20 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 26-27, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) 
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under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  This Part provides brief background on the debates 
over each, before turning to the relationship of patent assertion entities 
and claim construction in the remainder of the Essay. 
A.  The Patent “Troll” Debate 
1. Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debate
In recent years, patent assertion entities have been central to most 
debates over the patent system.  Patent assertion entities are estimated to 
have brought over 50% of all patent litigation in recent years.21  They have 
received attention, and often criticism, from the White House, Congress, 
Supreme Court Justices, Federal Circuit judges, the Federal Trade 
Commission, corporations and industry groups, academics, the popular 
press, and the public at large.22     
Although the exact terminology and definitions vary, in rough 
terms, patent assertion entities are patent holders that do not 
commercialize inventions or transfer technology ex ante in a way that 
helps other companies develop products.  Instead, patent assertion entities 
purchase patents for the purpose of extracting licensing fees by suing (or 
threatening to sue) companies that have already developed products 
allegedly covered by the patent.23 
A vigorous debate exists within the patent community regarding 
patent assertion entities.  The majority view is that patent assertion 
entities tax innovation, stifle research and development, enrich investors at 
the expense of product-producing companies, increase litigation and 
litigation costs, and bring weak claims.  The minority view contends that 
criticisms of patent assertion entities are overblown and unsupported 
and/or that patent assertion entities are actually beneficial to innovation 
by adding liquidity to the patent market and increasing the returns for 
small inventors.24 
The merits of this debate are complex, perhaps intractable, and 
21 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 5 
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf 
22 See, e.g., Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 1-2 (April 16, 2014); Executive Office of the President, Patent 
Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; Randall R. Rader 
et al., Making Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
23 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 3-4 
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf 
24 Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 4-8 (April 16, 2014) (summarizing debate). 
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beyond the Essay’s scope.  Instead, the Essay suggests that current claim 
construction rules and trends benefit, and perhaps even fuel, the patent 
assertion entity business model.  Those interested in reforms to restrict 
patent assertion entities would be well-advised to focus at least some of 
their attention on claim construction. 
2. The Relationship of Patent “Trolls” to Uncertain and Broad Claim
Scope
Claim scope is central to discussions (especially criticisms) of patent 
assertion entities, with patent assertion entities associated with uncertain 
and broad claim scope. 
First, the existence and success of patent assertion entities are 
often attributed to patents with “fuzzy boundaries” and vague claims.25  
Leading commentators suggest that patent assertion entities purposefully 
seek out patents with vague or ambiguous claim language for purchase.26  
This allows patent assertion entities to target technology that is different 
than that disclosed in the patent and developed after the patent issued but 
has now become firmly established and extract payments from those 
dependent on a particular technology.27  Relatedly, vagueness in claim 
language allows patent assertion entities to assert their patents broadly to 
cover a wide range of technology that exists in the market, technology that 
may only have a tangential relationship to that described in the patent.28  
Importantly, technology users cannot avoid infringement before developing 
or adopting a technology because the vague claim language hinders ex ante 
efforts to identify or design around the subsequently asserted patent.29  
Second, patent assertion entities are often said to rely on overly 
broad claim scope, whether due to the inherent breadth of the patent 
claims or because the ambiguity and vagueness of claim language permits 
the patent assertion entity to read the claim broadly.30  Broad patent scope 
allows the patent assertion entity to assert the patent against now-
established technologies developed after the patent issued, as well as to 
25 Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 9-10 (April 16, 2014). 
26 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, 
26, 26 (Winter 2011-2012). 
27 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, 
26, 26 (Winter 2011-2012); James Bessen, The patent troll crisis is really a software 
patent crisis, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013).  
28 James Bessen, The patent troll crisis is really a software patent crisis, 
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013). 
29 James Bessen, The patent troll crisis is really a software patent crisis, 
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013). 
30 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 6 
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf 
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assert it broadly against a large number of products and companies.  The 
result is increased returns from the patent assertion entity’s investment in 
a patent.31 
That patent assertion entities most commonly assert patents on 
software-related inventions supports the importance of ambiguous and 
broad claim scope to their business model.32  The most likely reason for the 
popularity of software patents among patent assertion entities is that 
software patents tend to have vague and broad claim language, often 
written in “functional” terms that define a goal, rather than a specific 
means of achieving that goal.33 
B.  Claim Construction Problems 
1. The Relationship of Claim Construction and Patent Scope
The legal rights conferred by a patent are judged by the “claims” at 
the end of the patent:  numbered paragraphs that describe the scope of the 
invention in a single, often tortuously written sentence.  Like the words of 
any other legal document, patent claims must be interpreted to be applied. 
This process is called “claim construction” in patent lingo.  Claim 
construction is widely recognized as the most important step in patent 
litigation.  It is a threshold step for virtually every other issue in a patent 
case.  And it is often case-dispositive or at least case-determinative 
(limiting the issues, the range of the dispute, facilitating settlement, etc.) 
because there is little dispute over the how the technology works.34   
The meaning of patent claim terms, like all words, is determined by 
the context in which they are used.  The context for patent claim terms 
includes the rest of the claim at issue, other claims in the patent, the 
description of the invention in the part of the patent referred to as the 
“specification,” and the record of the proceedings for obtaining the patent in 
the Patent and Trademark Office.  These sources of context are known as 
“intrinsic evidence.”  The context for patent claim terms also includes 
31 James Bessen, The patent troll crisis is really a software patent crisis, 
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013); Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion 
and U.S. Innovation, at 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf 
32 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 394 (2014) (noting that 62% of NPE lawsuits involve software 
patents). 
33 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 8 
(2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; see also Mark A. 
Lemley, Functional Claiming, 2013 WISCONSIN L. REV. 905. 
34 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary 
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 246, 256-257 (2014). 
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information about the background meaning of the term to a skilled person 
in the field (known as a “person having ordinary skill in the art” in patent 
lingo), as evidenced by dictionaries, treatises, other scientific texts, other 
patents, and expert testimony.  These sources of context are known as 
extrinsic evidence.35  The relative weight of the intrinsic context versus 
extrinsic context is hotly disputed, as discussed in Part I.B.2, infra. 
Claim construction is crucial to both the certainty and breadth of 
patent claims.  “[C]laim construction is fundamental to determining a 
patent’s scope”36 because the terms in a patent claim only acquire meaning, 
and therefore scope, when they are interpreted in the relevant context (i.e., 
construed).  Therefore, the process for interpreting claims – what context is 
consulted, in what order, for what purpose, etc. – will determine whether a 
claim has broad or narrow scope.37  Likewise, the extent to which the 
process for interpreting claims is well-known, predictable, and easily 
replicable ex ante is a significant determinant of the certainty or 
uncertainty (more accurately, predictability or unpredictability) of patent 
scope.38 
Unsurprisingly, uncertainty and overbreadth in patent claim scope 
often are associated with claim construction problems.  For example, one 
commentator noted that “uncertainty over the proper procedure for claim 
construction has led to uncertainty in patent scope, which in turn negates 
the notice and boundary-staking functions to be performed by the patent 
claim.”39  Another commentator pointed to flaws with the approach to claim 
construction as the cause of problematic breadth of patent claims.40 
2. Claim Construction Problems and Trends
Debates over claim construction have focused on two core problems. 
First, the primary focus of commentators has been the “uncertainty” 
created by the Federal Circuit’s high rate of reversal of district court claim 
construction decisions.41  In previous work, I referred to the uncertainty 
35 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary 
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 257-264 (2014). 
36 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of 
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2007). 
37 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their 
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 103-104 (2005). 
38 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their 
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 99-100 (2005). 
39 Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 
64 (2006). 
40 See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2012). 
41 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of 
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2007). 
22-Sep-15]   PATENT “TROLLS” AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 11 
created by high reversal rates as “ex post uncertainty” because it only 
affected the ability to evaluate claim scope after litigation had been filed 
and after the district court had issued a claim construction decision.  I 
argued that “ex post uncertainty” was far less significant than the difficulty 
of evaluating claim scope in advance of litigation, which I called “ex ante 
unpredictability.”  Because the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate had 
little to no effect on ex ante predictability, I questioned the importance of 
the standard of review.42   
Regardless, conventional wisdom held that the Federal Circuit’s de 
novo standard of claim construction review created uncertain claim scope, 
with “an avalanche of critical commentary” and repeated, sharply split 
Federal Circuit en banc decisions.43  Ultimately, the Supreme Court in 
Teva v. Sandoz held that the Federal Circuit must review the “evidentiary 
underpinnings” of claim construction for “clear error,” rather than de 
novo.44 
The second major problem with claim construction – a deep and 
persistent split within the precedent as to the proper approach to claim 
construction – has received comparatively less attention than the standard 
of review.  Yet, because it directly affects ex ante predictability of claim 
scope, it is far more important.45  Although variably described, 
commentators generally agree there are two identifiable and conflicting 
methodological approaches.  The primary difference between the two 
approaches is to what extent claim construction should rely on the written 
description of the invention found in the patent specification and to what 
extent it should rely on the background or general meaning of the claim 
term in the field of invention.  Put another way, the split is over what 
constitutes the primary context for understanding patent claim terms:  the 
patent itself or the background or general knowledge in the field.46 
The first claim construction methodology, which I call the “general 
meaning” approach (and others refer to as the “heavy presumption” or 
“procedural” approach), emphasizes the background or general meaning in 
42 Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted:  Why the Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong 
Claim Construction Issue for En Banc Review, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43, 47-48 
(2013). 
43 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of 
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2007); see also Lighting Ballast 
Control v. Philips Electronics, 744 F. 3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
44 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015). 
45 Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted:  Why the Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong 
Claim Construction Issue for En Banc Review, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43 (2013). 
46 For a more detailed description and analysis of the methodological split, see Greg 
Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary Reader 
Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 246-248, 256-266 (2014), upon 
which the following paragraphs rely. 
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the field, with only a limited role for the specification to alter this meaning. 
Under this approach, claim construction begins with a “heavy 
presumption” in favor of the “general,” “plain,” and or “ordinary” meaning 
of the claim term to a skilled person in the field.  Although not explicitly 
stated, this general meaning is presumably identified through extrinsic 
evidence of the understanding in the field, such as expert testimony, 
dictionaries, or scientific texts.  Claim construction then turns to the 
specification to see if the patentee varied this general meaning. 
Importantly, this approach severely limits variance from the general 
meaning, permitting a “quite narrow” exception to general meaning only if 
the specification meets an “exacting standard.”  Specifically, the patentee 
must have “clearly set forth” an express definition different from the 
general meaning or used “expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction” 
that clearly and unmistakably disclaimed claim scope.47 
The second approach to claim construction, which I call the “patent-
focused approach” (and others refer to as the “Phillips,” “Vitronics,” or 
“holistic” approach) emphasizes the meaning that the claim term bears in 
the patent itself, regardless of the meaning it would generally have in the 
field of the invention.  A claim term’s meaning is primarily derived by the 
contextual clues provided in the specification, which can define a claim 
term explicitly or implicitly.  Extrinsic evidence can provide useful 
background information to understand the specification but cannot support 
a claim interpretation broader than that suggested by the specification.48 
The Federal Circuit’s 2006 en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH 
Corp. seemed to resolve the methodological split in favor of a patent-
focused approach.49  Unfortunately, empirical evidence demonstrates that 
the Federal Circuit’s precedent remains as divided on claim construction 
methodology as before Phillips.50  Despite Phillips’ fairly clear endorsement 
of a patent-focused approach, “courts have quietly been shifting back 
towards a ‘heavy presumption of ordinary meaning’ . . . with only limited 
47 Recent examples of this approach include:  Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent’mt 
Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, 
Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J. dissenting from the 
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).  For further description of this approach, 
see Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary 
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 262-263 (2014). 
48 An example of this approach is Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 
1576, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  For further description of this approach, see Greg Reilly, 
Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary Reader Standard, 20 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 263-264 (2014). 
49 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
50 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh 
ed., 2013). 
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exceptions when there has been lexicography or an express disclaimer,” a 
“trend [that] has been largely without fanfare.”51 
The methodological split is not just a matter of semantics.  Federal 
Circuit judges acknowledge a “fundamental split within the court as 
to . . . the proper approach to claim interpretation.”52  Empirical evidence 
confirms that the outcome of claim construction appeals depends on the 
methodological preference of the panel of Federal Circuit judges and that 
most disputes over claim construction result from disagreements over 
methodology.  Specifically, 95% of splits within Federal Circuit panels and 
75-82% of Federal Circuit reversals of district court claim constructions 
result from differences in the methodological approach applied.53  
C.  The Disconnect Between Patent “Troll” Debates and Claim 
Construction Debates 
The role of claim construction has been largely absent from debates 
over patent assertion entities.  Claim construction reform is not on the 
agenda for current patent reform efforts focused on combatting patent 
assertion entities.54  Instead, reform proposals treat claim construction as 
part of the solution to current patent issues.  Patent reform legislation 
would import the process for claim construction used in the district courts – 
long bemoaned by commentators – into U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) proceedings where the validity of the patent is challenged after the 
patent has been issued by the PTO.55  Other patent reform proposals would 
stay almost all discovery until after claim construction, on the assumption 
that claim construction will successfully weed out frivolous or weak claims 
brought by patent assertion entities.56 
Even though claim construction has previously been blamed for 
uncertain and broad claim scope, claim construction is rarely mentioned as 
a way to reduce the uncertainty and breadth of claim scope in order to 
address the patent assertion entity “problem.”  The most popular proposals 
focus on strengthening the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 that the claims 
51 Steven C. Carlson & Uttam G. Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on 
Claim Construction, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 9, 2013). 
52 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (Moore, J. dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). 
53 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1143-44, 1163-
70 (2004). 
54 Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, available at 
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-
guide-patent-reform-legislation/ (last visited May, 30, 2015). 
55 Innovation Act, H.R. 9, § 9(b) (114th Cong., 1st Session). 
56 Innovation Act, H.R. 9, § 3(d) (114th Cong., 1st Session); PATENT Act, S. 1137, 
§ 5 (114th Cong., 1st Session).
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be “definite” and that the patent include a “written description” 
demonstrating that the patentee possessed the invention at the time of 
filing and an enabling disclosure that permits a skilled person in the field 
to make and use the invention.57  Other proposals include reducing the 
ability of patentees to hide or delay patent applications in the Patent and 
Trademark Office58 and including glossaries of key claim terms within the 
patent.59  Claim construction, however, has been ignored.  To the contrary, 
overestimating the impact of Phillips v. AWH Corp. in resolving the 
Federal Circuit’s methodological split, the Federal Trade Commission 
concluded that current claim construction doctrine “marks a beneficial step 
from the perspective of public notice.”60 
The connection between patent assertion entities and claim 
construction has been recognized in the limited context of interpreting 
functional claims in software patents.61  Professor Mark Lemley has 
suggested a particular solution to the problem of functional claiming in 
software patents by interpreting functional claims as limited to the means 
for implementing the function described in the patent.62  In essence, the 
proposal would except functional claims in software patents from normal 
claim construction rules and create special claim construction rules specific 
to software functional claims, rules that are essentially a strong version of 
the patent-focused approach.  Professor Lemley and others seem to assume 
that the problem with functional software claims results from the inherent 
indeterminacy of software claims, rather than the problems with the claim 
construction process addressed in this Essay.63 
Thus, the role of claim construction issues in facilitating the patent 
assertion entity business model is an important issue that has been largely 
absent from debates over patent assertion entities.  The converse is also 
true.  The beneficial effects for patent assertion entities have been largely 
overlooked in the claim construction debates.   
57 Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 17 (April 16, 2014). 
58 Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 17 (April 16, 2014). 
59 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 110 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
60 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 102 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
61 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 394 (2014). 
62 Mark A. Lemley, Functional Claiming, 2013 WISCONSIN L. REV. 905. 
63 Mark A. Lemley, Functional Claiming, 2013 WISCONSIN L. REV. 905, 919-928 
(suggesting problem with software claims comes primarily from nature of software and 
nature of claim drafting). 
22-Sep-15]   PATENT “TROLLS” AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 15 
II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS AND TRENDS HAVE, AND WILL,
BENEFIT PATENT “TROLLS” 
This Part turns to the intersection of the parallel debates over 
patent assertion entities and claim construction explored in Part I.  Patent 
assertion entities benefit from three major problems in claim construction: 
the methodological split, the continued vitality of the general meaning 
approach, and the appellate standard of review.  Surprisingly, while the 
general tide of patent law moves to limit and undermine patent assertion 
entities, claim construction trends are unwittingly moving in the opposite 
direction, i.e., in ways favorable to patent assertion entities. 
A.  The Claim Construction Split, Uncertainty, and Patent 
Assertion Entities 
1. How the Claim Construction Split Benefits Patent Assertion Entities
In theory, competitors and the public should be able to “understand 
what is the scope of the patent owner’s rights by obtaining the patent and 
prosecution history . . . and applying established rules of construction” and 
“be able to rest assured . . . that a judge . . . will similarly analyze the text 
of the patent and its associated public record and apply the established 
rules of construction.”64  However, the Federal Circuit’s split over the 
proper approach to claim construction makes it difficult to “understand 
what is the scope of the patent owner’s rights” for two reasons.   
First, there are no “established rules of construction.”  Rather, there 
are two competing sets of rules for construction.  One set of rules starts 
with a presumption in favor of the extrinsic, general meaning of the term 
in the field and only looks to the use in the patent itself for a clear and 
unmistakable rebuttal of this presumption.  The other set of rules starts 
with the usage of the term in the patent itself and only looks to extrinsic 
usage to help clarify the intrinsic usage.  The scope of the patentee’s rights 
depends on the choice between these two sets of rules.65  However, a 
competitor has no reliable basis on which to choose between them, as both 
have significant precedential support.66 
64 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 978-979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), aff’d 517 U.S. 370 (1996).  
65 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1170 (2004) 
(‘The Federal Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence evinces a distinct split in 
methodological approach, a dichotomy that both involves a significant number of 
decisions and appears to affect the results of the cases.”). 
66 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and 
Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 100 (2005) (“With only one 
methodology used, different individuals more likely will interpret the claims in the 
same manner, and thus, a higher likelihood of getting a similar result will exist.”). 
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Second, competitors cannot “rest assured . . . that a judge . . . will 
similarly analyze” the claim terms.  If a competitor chooses to act based on 
a certain understanding of claim scope derived using one of the existing 
methodological approaches, it cannot predict that an unknown judge 
construing the claims in an unknown litigation will adopt the same 
approach.67  Different judges take different approaches to claim 
construction and, often, even the same judge will take different approaches 
to claim construction from case to case.68 
In this way, the Federal Circuit’s split over the proper approach to 
claim construction is a contributor to the uncertainty of patent scope, 
perhaps a significant contributor.  As one commentator explained, 
“[r]egardless of a methodology’s specifics, an inherent certainty [would be] 
created once courts decide on a single methodology.”69  There is near 
universal agreement that uncertain patent scope is a significant factor in 
the rise and success of patent assertion entities – a conclusion endorsed by 
the Federal Trade Commission,70 Congressional Research Service,71 White 
House,72 academics,73 and technology companies.74  If uncertain patent 
scope is a major factor fueling patent assertion entities and the Federal 
Circuit’s split over the proper claim construction approach is a major cause 
of uncertain patent scope, the Federal Circuit’s continued claim 
construction split inures to the benefit of patent assertion entities. 
I do not suggest that the Federal Circuit’s claim construction split is 
the sole cause of the uncertain patent scope on which patent assertion 
entities prey.  Other factors are certainly at play, including “continuation” 
67 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and 
Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 99 (2005) (“Without clear 
direction from the courts in the form of a single methodology, one cannot predict a 
claim's meaning because of the uncertainty about which methodology will be used.”). 
68 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1143-44, 1163-
70 (2004) (concluding that “[t]he methodological approaches of individual judges on the 
Federal Circuit vary widely” and that “most Federal Circuit judges have relatively 
similar levels of inconsistency in claim construction methodology, but a small group is 
substantially more consistent”). 
69 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their 
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 99 (2005). 
70 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 9 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
71 Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 9 (April 16, 2014). 
72 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 4 
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf 
73 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 393-394 (2014). 
74 Comments of Google Inc., In re: Strategies for Improving Claim Clarity: Glossary 
Use in Defining Claim Terms, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 5 (Oct. 23, 2013). 
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practice at the Patent Office that allows patentees to write claims to cover 
later developments in the market, the inherent indeterminacy of language 
(or at least of describing software inventions in written words), and 
perhaps the indefiniteness doctrine.75  Professor Lemley is undoubtedly 
correct that widespread use of functional claiming – which defines the 
invention by what it does, not how it does it – in software patents is a 
major contributor to the patent “thicket” that undermines public notice.76  
And, as explained in Part II.B, infra, the actual content of claim 
construction rules contribute to uncertain patent scope.77 My claim is more 
modest: there is an important connection between the claim construction 
split and patent assertion entities that is being overlooked in both the 
debates over claim construction and the debates over patent assertion 
entities.   
2. How Current Trends Benefit Patent Assertion Entities
To some extent, it is difficult to identify any “trend” in the case law 
and commentary related to the Federal Circuit’s claim construction split 
for the simple reason that the Federal Circuit has been significantly 
divided for a decade and a half.78  Empirical evidence indicates that 
Federal Circuit opinions in the years immediately after 2005’s Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., where the en banc court addressed the proper methodological 
approach, were as divided on methodology as they were before.79  Anecdotal 
accounts offer a more complex story in which early decisions after Phillips 
largely followed a single, patent-focused methodology, with a more recent 
rise in the “general meaning” approach returning the Federal Circuit’s 
claim construction doctrine to the same split that existed before Phillips.80  
Regardless of whether the Federal Circuit is becoming more divided 
or is simply as divided as ever, the existence and importance of the Federal 
Circuit’s methodological split is increasingly ignored or downplayed.  Post-
Phillips, attention to the split over claim construction probably peaked in 
75 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 9 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
76 Mark A. Lemley, Functional Claiming, 2013 WISCONSIN L. REV. 905. 
77 See also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and 
Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 99 (2005). (“The methodology 
chosen can still be unpredictable in application because of the canons it chooses to 
use.”). 
78 See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 
5 (2000) (describing split between what the author labeled “pragmatic textualism” and 
“hyper textualism”). 
79 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?  Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 133-135 (S. Balganesh, ed., 2013) (finding “virtually 
no change” in methodological split after Phillips through 2007). 
80 Steven Carlson & Uttam Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on Claim 
Construction, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 9, 2013).  
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2011 with a vigorous dissent from the Federal Circuit’s denial of rehearing 
en banc identifying “a fundamental split within the court as to . . . the 
proper approach to claim interpretation.”81  However, the Federal Circuit’s 
methodological split is increasingly absent from patent debates.  For 
example, in briefing to the Supreme Court in Nautilus v. Biosig, the 
indefiniteness doctrine at issue in that case was blamed for uncertain 
patent scope, with the role of claim construction and the claim construction 
split ignored.82  Moreover, in reactions to the Supreme Court’s adoption of a 
more deferential standard of review for claim construction in Teva v. 
Sandoz, commentators have described the Federal Circuit as having a 
singular “established methodology for construing claims,”83 overlooking the 
deep methodological split that Professors Wagner and Petherbridge 
empirically reconfirmed only a year before Teva.84  Two leading 
commentators even hope that Teva solved long-standing claim construction 
problems, optimistically suggesting that implementation of Teva could 
result in “effective, transparent, and well-reasoned patent claim 
constructions” and that “patent litigation will become more predictable and 
understandable.”85  Again, the methodological split and its contribution to 
uncertain patent scope are overlooked 
Downplaying or ignoring the Federal Circuit’s split over the proper 
approach to claim construction is good for patent assertion entities.  Patent 
assertion entities benefit from the uncertain claim scope resulting from the 
absence of a single approach to claim construction.  The longer the Federal 
Circuit’s split persists, the better for patent assertion entities’ prospects. 
And the less attention the split receives, the longer it is likely to remain. 
Unsurprisingly, the patent stakeholders actually focused on the connection 
between the methodological split, uncertain patent scope, and patent 
assertion entities are the major technology companies most frequently 
targeted by patent assertion entities.86   
81 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (Moore, J. dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). 
82 Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1353 (2014). 
83 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD 
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 19-22). 
84 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 144-145 (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., 2013). 
85 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in 
Patent Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 187, 198 (2015). 
86 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 20-22, 26-
27, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) 
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B.  The General Meaning Approach, Unpredictability, 
Overbreadth, and Patent Assertion Entities 
1. How the General Meaning Approach Benefits Patent Assertion Entities
Beyond the mere existence of a split over claim construction 
approach, the content of claim construction rules also affect the prospects 
for patent assertion entities.  Different approaches to claim construction 
differ in the degree of predictability and breadth of claim scope they 
produce.87  For reasons previously explained, patent assertion entities 
prefer a claim construction approach that tends to produce less predictable 
and broader claim scope.88  The “general meaning” approach to claim 
construction – where claim construction starts with extrinsic sources as to 
the abstract meaning in the field of invention and only looks to the 
specification for a clear deviation from this abstract meaning – does exactly 
that.  As a result, its continued support within the claim construction 
precedent helps patent assertion entities. 
Some scholars believe that the general meaning approach results in 
more predictable claim scope.89  They assume that skilled people can 
simply apply their own understanding of the claim term – an 
understanding that reflects the general understanding in the field – with 
confidence that the claim construction adopted in subsequent litigation will 
reflect this understanding.90  While theoretically sound, this represents an 
idealized view of actual litigation.  The incentives in litigation are likely to 
result in a battle of experts (or expert texts) each asserting a “general 
meaning” that is most favorable to its side’s litigation position, regardless 
of any connection to any actual “general meaning” in the field (to the extent 
one even exists).91  Nor are generalist judges well-situated to sort through 
the ex post, litigation-driven “general meanings” and accurately identify 
the true “general meaning” in the field.92 
Anecdotal evidence from those on the ground confirms that scholars 
87 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their 
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 100 (2005). 
88 See Part II.A.2, supra. 
89 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 144-145 (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., 2013). 
90 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 144-145 (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., 2013). 
91 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary 
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 271-277 (2014). 
92 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary 
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 271-277 (2014). 
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are overly optimistic when they assume the “general meaning” approach 
promotes predictability of claim scope.  The Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) surveyed a wide range of stakeholders within the patent system, 
finding, among other things, that there was widespread concern about 
uncertain patent scope, especially in the information technology sector.  
Importantly, though, the FTC noted that “[t]hose who found claim 
construction manageable emphasized the importance of looking beyond the 
claims themselves and relying heavily on review of the patent’s description 
of the invention to sort out claim meaning.”93  A group of the nation’s 
leading information technology companies – the industry in which patent 
notice problems are widely agreed to be most severe94 – concur:  “[d]ecisions 
that divorce claim terms from the context of the written description 
entrench claim ambiguity and litigation uncertainty.”95 
The patent-focused approach encourages heavy reliance on the 
specification to understand claim meaning, whereas the “general meaning” 
approach limits reliance on the specification to explicit definitions or clear 
disclaimers of claim scope.  “From a notice perspective,” the patent-focused 
approach “works best.”96  As the FTC explained, when claim construction is 
primarily driven by the patent itself, “[a] third party seeking to understand 
a claim’s meaning can view the intrinsic evidence by reading the patent 
and consulting the file wrapper (containing the prosecution history). The 
material is easily identifiable by, and accessible to, third parties” ex ante.97  
By contrast, when claim construction emphasizes the supposed “general 
meaning” in the technical field, claim meaning depends on external texts 
and expert testimony identified or developed ex post for purposes of 
litigation.  “A third party therefore cannot know in advance what external 
evidence will be utilized” because there are a variety of potential external 
texts or expert witnesses which will support a variety of supposed “general 
meanings.”98  Thus, the patent-focused approach better promotes 
predictability of claim scope, whereas the general meaning approach 
93 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 82 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
94 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 80 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]; Brian T. Yeh, An 
Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 9 (April 16, 
2014). 
95 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Lighting 
Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en 
banc) (joined by Google, Amazon, HP, Red Hat, and Yahoo!). 
96 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 102 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
97 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 102 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
98 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 102 & n.181 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (quoting 
stakeholder as saying that “if you start to look at external records, even in biotech, 
there you can probably find five different people to say five different things”). 
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increases the unpredictability of claim scope upon which patent assertion 
entities rely.99 
The different claim construction methodologies also produce 
different claim scope.  Specifically, the general meaning approach will tend 
to produce broader claim scope than the patent-focused approach.100  Even 
those generally supportive of the general meaning approach acknowledge 
that it is likely to “yield broader interpretations.”101  This is because the 
patent-focused approach limits the context available for claim construction 
to that found in the patent itself.  “The patent’s disclosure sets a ceiling for 
the claim’s meaning, and thus, the literal scope of exclusivity afforded to 
the patent.”102  By contrast, the general meaning approach “moves the 
claim term’s meaning from the context of the patent to the abstract,” which 
will naturally expand the potential claim scope.103  The specification does 
not generally limit claim scope under this approach.104  Rather, the only 
limit on claim scope is the ability to find some expert text, however 
tangentially relevant, or some paid expert witness to support a supposed 
“general meaning.”105 
Thus, the general meaning approach to claim construction produces 
unpredictable and broad claim scope, the very conditions in which patent 
assertion entities thrive.106  Unsurprisingly, in litigation, patent assertion 
99 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 21, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) (endorsing patent-
focused approach and rejecting general meaning approach based on certainty concerns). 
100 Steven C. Carlson & Uttam G. Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on 
Claim Construction, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 9, 2013) (noting that 
claims are “overwhelmingly construed broadly” under the general meaning approach, 
which authors refer to as “heavy presumption of ordinary meaning” standard); 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim 
Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 121-122 (2005) (noting that the “heavy 
presumption,” i.e., general meaning, methodology may give the patentee “the greatest 
possible breadth of patent protection”). 
101 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1142 (2004) 
(referring to “general meaning” approach as “procedural methodology”); see also 
Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Moore, J. dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) 
(acknowledging that the “general meaning” approach can produce claim scope broader 
than a patent-focused approach but arguing that this is a problem of invalidity). 
102 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their 
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 108 (2005). 
103 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their 
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 114 (2005). 
104 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their 
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 110 (2005). 
105 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary 
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 276-277 (2014). 
106 See Part I.A.2, supra. 
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entities often rely on the general meaning approach in formulating claim 
construction positions.  As one practitioner explained, “[w]hen the claim 
construction phase occurs, the claim construction proposed by plaintiff in 
such [patent “troll”] cases is typically superficial, often consisting of ‘no 
construction required,’ ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ or ‘dictionary 
definition,’ with the goal a construction that results in infringement with 
some wiggle room to avoid prior art.”107  Two other practitioners concluded 
that “[p]atent trolls excel[] under this [general meaning] standard, with 
infringement easier to prove, and patent invalidity always an elusive and 
risky path.”108  Probably for these exact reasons, the most common targets 
of patent assertion entities – the nation’s leading technology companies – 
vehemently rejected the general meaning approach and endorsed the 
patent-focused approach, arguing that “[i]t is improper to ignore the 
specification in favor of a ‘plain meaning’ analysis divorced from the 
context of the patent.”109 
2. How Current Trends Benefit Patent Assertion Entities
Even as the patent community is increasingly obsessed by how to 
combat patent assertion entities, the claim construction case law and 
scholarship are moving in favor of patent assertion entity’s preferred claim 
construction methodology: the general meaning approach. 
The case law long has been split between the “general meaning” 
and patent-focused approaches, a split that Professors Wagner and 
Petherbridge found to have remained fairly consistent after the Federal 
Circuit’s 2005 Phillips decision, at least through 2007 (the end of their 
study).110  However, anecdotal reports suggest that in the past few years 
“claim construction law for now is swinging in the direction” of the “general 
meaning” approach, with more cases taking this approach than before and 
the newer Federal Circuit judges favoring it.111  Moreover, although the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Teva v. Sandoz addressed the standard of 
107 Christopher Hu, 26 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL No. 8, 
at 1, 3 (2014). 
108 Steven C. Carlson & Uttam G. Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on 
Claim Construction, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 9, 2013) (referring to 
“general meaning” approach as “heavy presumption” methodology). 
109 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 21-22, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) (joined by Google, Dell, 
HP, Salesforce.com, Twitter, Yahoo!, Acushnet, eBay, Kaspersky Lab, Limelight 
Networks, Newegg, QVC, SAS Institute, and Xilink) 
110 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 134-135 (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., 2013) 
111 Steven C. Carlson & Uttam G. Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on 
Claim Construction, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 9, 2013). 
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appellate review, not methodology, for claim construction, the Court did 
endorse district court’s “consult[ing] extrinsic evidence in order to 
understand . . . the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the 
relevant time period.”112  Some scholars have read this as consistent with 
an approach to claim construction that starts with extrinsic evidence about 
the meaning of the term in the field and only then checks to see if the 
intrinsic evidence is inconsistent with this meaning, i.e., an approach 
similar to the general meaning approach.113 
Teva could result in greater use of the “general meaning” approach 
for an additional reason.  Under Teva, district courts receive deference for 
findings on subsidiary factual issues underpinning claim construction, such 
as the general meaning of the term in the technical field or resolution of 
conflicting expert testimony, but no deference when claim construction is 
based solely on the intrinsic evidence within the patent document and 
prosecution history.114  This gives district judges incentives to rely heavily 
on extrinsic evidence and expert testimony – such as by using the general 
meaning approach, not the patent-focused approach – in order to insure 
deferential review from the Federal Circuit.115  On the other hand, the 
incentive Teva provides district courts to use the general meaning 
approach may be counterbalanced by the incentive it provides the Federal 
Circuit to emphasize greater or exclusive use of the intrinsic record – 
consistent with the patent-focused approach – so as to avoid having to defer 
to district court claim constructions.116 
Beyond the case law, claim construction scholarship increasingly 
favors the “general meaning” approach.  In the past, the scholarship, like 
the case law, was divided between the patent-focused and general meaning 
approaches.117  However, recent work from leading scholars endorses, to 
112 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 840-842 (2015). 
113 Dennis Crouch, Giving Deference to the Supreme Court in Teva v. Sandoz, 
PATENTLYO (Jan. 21, 2015), available at http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/deference-
supreme-sandoz.html (quoting Professor Rantanen but noting that other commentators 
disagreed); Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD 
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 25); see also J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, 
Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in Patent Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 187, 198 (2015) (arguing that Teva “affords [district courts] greater flexibility to 
use familiar tools for resolving factual disputes—presentation of [extrinsic] evidence 
and expert testimony”). 
114 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2015). 
115 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 23, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015). 
116 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD 
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 19-22) (suggesting that this has been Federal 
Circuit’s reaction to Teva). 
117 Compare, e.g.,  Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation 
Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 (2005) 
(endorsing patent-focused approach); Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form 
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varying extents, approaches to claim construction more consistent with the 
general meaning approach than the patent-focused approach.  Professors 
Wagner and Petherbridge explicitly endorse “[a]n approach to patent claim 
construction that firmly embraces the commonly understood meaning of 
words and places the burden on the patent applicant to clearly explain any 
deviations from the ordinary meaning” and reject “an open-ended search 
for ‘contextual’ meaning in the patent document and prosecution 
history.”118  Similarly, Professor Rantanen advocates “a claim construction 
process where the judge begins by making a factual determination about 
the meaning of a claim term to a person of skill in the art [using extrinsic 
evidence] and then considers the intrinsic evidence of the patent to arrive 
at a legal conclusion as to its meaning in the patent.”119  Professor Crouch 
believes that “the rule that extrinsic evidence is of secondary importance 
and perhaps should not be considered absent ambiguity in the intrinsic 
evidence . . .  is contrary to the rule that the interpretation should be based 
upon the contemporary understanding of a person having ordinary skill in 
the art.”120  And Professors Anderson and Menell criticize relying just on 
the intrinsic evidence and instead endorse an approach that “place[s] 
greater emphasis on skilled artisans, inventors, patent attorneys, and 
patent agents in tracing the drafting of patent claim terms and their 
understanding to skilled artisans in the context of the particular patent.”121 
The recent cases and scholarship favoring the general meaning 
approach to claim construction seem not to appreciate the beneficial effects 
this approach has for patent assertion entities.  This trend is again 
inconsistent with the general tide of patent law, which aims to reduce the 
prevalence and power of patent assertion entities. 
& Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333 (2007) (same); with, e.g., 
Kristen Osenga, Linguistics & Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61 (2006) 
(endorsing approach more similar to “general meaning” approach); R. Polk Wagner & 
Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of 
Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (same). 
118 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 143-145 (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., 2013). 
119 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD 
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 22-25). 
120 Dennis Crouch, Teva v. Sandoz: Partial Deference in Claim Construction, 
PATENTLYO (Jan. 20, 2015), available at http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/partial-
deference-construction.html.  
121 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
68, 75 (2013). 
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C.  The Standard of Review, Forum Choice, and Patent Assertion 
Entities 
1. How Deferential Review Benefits Patent Assertion Entities
The appropriate appellate standard of review for claim construction 
– the Federal Circuit’s long-standing de novo standard or some more
deferential standard – has received extensive attention over the past 
fifteen years.122  Despite the volumes of ink spilled, there has been little 
development of the connection between the standard of review and patent 
assertion entities.  If anything, the ubiquitous assertion that more 
deferential review will increase certainty of patent scope123 could suggest 
that deferential review will undermine patent assertion entities. 
As I have explained elsewhere, more deferential appellate review of 
claim construction is unlikely to have a significant impact on certainty of 
claim scope.124  Deferential review may improve to some extent the ex post 
certainty of claim construction after the district court has issued its claim 
construction.  Even this is unlikely to be significant as long as the 
methodological split exists because the district judge’s choice of 
methodology is a question of law subject to de novo review, even if the 
underlying claim construction is reviewed deferentially.  More importantly, 
deferential appellate review has no impact on the far more important 
question of ex ante predictability, i.e., whether claim scope can accurately 
be predicted in advance of litigation.  Thus, the likelihood that deferential 
review of claim construction will improve predictability of claim scope in a 
way that will affect patent assertion entities is low.   
On the other hand, in two ways, deferential review of claim 
construction is likely to benefit patent assertion entities.  First, as 
discussed in Part II.B.2, supra, deferential review incentivizes district 
judges to place greater reliance on the general meaning approach to claim 
construction and extrinsic evidence more generally.125  The result is likely 
to be greater uncertainty and breadth of claim scope, the exact conditions 
in which patent assertion entities thrive.126   
122 See Part I.B.2, supra. 
123 See Part I.B.2, supra. 
124 Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted:  Why the Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong 
Claim Construction Issue for En Banc Review, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43 (2013). 
125 See also J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
68, 75 (2013) (endorsing deferential review exactly because it will lead to greater 
emphasis on extrinsic texts and expert witnesses); Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and 
Change Without Change, __ STANFORD TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 22-25) 
(hoping that deferential review will lead to this result). 
126 See Part II.B.1, supra.  This is true unless the incentives the Federal Circuit has 
to emphasize the intrinsic record, so as to increase its ability to review claim 
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Second, the more deferential standard of review provides greater 
power and discretion to the district judge.127  Some may see this as a 
benefit of deferential review, as the Federal Circuit is often seen as too 
powerful and self-aggrandizing.128  Similarly, some may believe that 
deferential review, and therefore less power for the Federal Circuit, will 
undermine patent assertion entities, since the Federal Circuit is often seen 
as pro-patentee.129  However, empirical evidence demonstrates that, at 
least in recent years, the Federal Circuit used its de novo review power to 
the detriment of patentees.  Professor Cotropia’s study of Federal Circuit 
claim construction decisions between 2010 and 2013 found that “[l]ower 
court decisions where the patentee wins are more likely to be subject to a 
claim construction reversal that prompts a change in the case’s outcome,” 
whereas “in cases where the patentee loses below . . . the claim 
construction affirmance rate is the highest.”130  These effects were 
strongest “in cases involving electronic, information technology, or business 
method patents,”131 the very areas in which patent assertion entities are 
most prevalent.  Thus, assuming more deferential review of claim 
construction results in fewer reversals, patentees, especially patent 
assertion entities, will benefit, since reversals under de novo review were 
concentrated in cases where the patentee won below in the technical areas 
where patent assertion entities are the most active. 
This potential result of deferential review is exacerbated by the 
increasing recognition that judges in certain districts, especially the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, seek to attract patent 
litigation by distorting their decisions in favor of the patentee (who chooses 
the forum), or “forum selling.”132  As a result, 29% of 2014 patent cases 
construction de novo under Teva, leads it to resolve the claim construction spilt in favor 
of the patent-only approach.  See id.  
127 Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law (June 2015 manuscript at 
37), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616412 (describing how Teva 
and other Supreme Court decisions “elevat[e] districts courts and the PTO in influence 
relative to the Federal Circuit”).  
128 Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law (June 2015 manuscript at 
37), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616412 (describing how 
Federal Circuit “tends to enhance its own power” and how de novo review of claim 
construction “allowed the Federal Circuit to assume greater power over a crucial aspect 
of patent litigation”). 
129 Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law (June 2015 manuscript at 
37), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616412 (describing Federal 
Circuit as “a pro-patent institution”). 
130 Christopher A. Cotropia, Is Patent Claim Interpretation Deference or Correction 
Driven?, 2014 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (Feb. 7, 2014 manuscript at 4), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2265962. 
131 Christopher A. Cotropia, Is Patent Claim Interpretation Deference or Correction 
Driven?, 2014 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (Feb. 7, 2014 manuscript at 4), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2265962. 
132 J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 
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were filed in the Eastern District of Texas,133 as were an astounding 44% of 
patent cases filed in the first half of 2015.134  Patent assertion entities in 
particular prefer to litigate in the Eastern District of Texas.135  To date, the 
Eastern District’s primary means for attracting patent cases has been pro-
patentee procedures.136  However, increased deference to district court 
claim construction decisions makes substantive differences between 
districts on claim construction more important, as they would be more 
likely to withstand appellate scrutiny.  This will provide even greater 
incentives for patentees, including patent assertion entities, to file in the 
districts most favorable to them.137  It also could incentivize the Eastern 
District of Texas, and other forum selling districts, to compete for patentees 
by offering them even more favorable (likely broader) claim construction 
decisions.138 
Rough empirical evidence suggests that the Eastern District of 
Texas already does so.139  The leading, or perhaps most extreme, example 
of the general meaning approach favored by patent assertion entities was 
Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,140 a decision subsequently 
631(2015); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857.    
133 Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857.    
134 Brian Howard, 2015 First Half Patent Case Filing Trends, LEXMACHINA (July 
14, 2015), https://lexmachina.com/2015-first-half-patent-case-filing-trends/ (finding 
1387 of 3122 patent cases filed in first half of 2015 were filed in Eastern District of 
Texas). 
135 Government Accounting Office, Assessing Factors That Affect Patent 
Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent Quality, Report No. GAO-13-465, at 
24 (Aug. 2013) (finding that patent assertion entities “filed more lawsuits in the 
Eastern District of Texas than other types of plaintiffs” and that 39% of their cases 
were filed there compared to 8% of cases filed by other types of plaintiffs). 
136 Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857.  
137 Brief for Intel Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) (suggesting that patent 
assertion entities are “especially likely to exploit forum-shopping opportunities” created 
by deferential review of claim construction). 
138 Cf. J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
68, 75 (2013) (noting argument that de novo review could control “renegade districts” 
but rejecting it because Eastern District of Texas does not have unusual reversal rate 
compared to other districts). 
139 This is a quick study, not a comprehensive analysis.  It shares the problems of 
any study relying on decisions reported on Westlaw or Lexis.  Moreover, it does not 
address for what purpose the cases were cited or their effects on outcomes; for example, 
the Eastern District may be citing Texas Digital for a basic point of law not renounced 
in Phillips. 
140 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent 
Hermeneutics: Form & Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 354 
(2007). 
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“renounced”141 (even if not formally overruled) by the en banc Federal 
Circuit’s 2005 Phillips decision.142  The leading example of the patent-
focused approach is probably Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., a 
decision that was expressly reaffirmed by Phillips.143  Unsurprisingly given 
their relative precedential status, Phillips was cited nine times more 
frequently than Texas Digital nationwide from 2006-2013 and Vitronics six 
times more frequently than Texas Digital.  But in the Eastern District of 
Texas, Phillips was cited only four times more frequently than Texas 
Digital and Vitronics only three times more frequently than Texas 
Digital.144  Thus, while the Eastern District cites Phillips and Vitronics at 
rates comparable to elsewhere, it cites the patent-assertion-entity-friendly 
Texas Digital general meaning decision far more frequently than normal.145  
This is consistent with, though hardly dispositive of, a conclusion that the 
Eastern District of Texas’ claim construction decisions benefit patent 
assertion entities, decisions that are more likely to withstand appellate 
scrutiny under deferential review. 
On the other hand, Professors Anderson and Menell found that the 
Eastern District of Texas does not fare worse on appellate review of claim 
construction than other districts.  For that reason, they rejected any 
concern that deferential review of claim construction was problematic in 
light of the existence of “renegade” districts like the Eastern District of 
Texas.146  While interesting, it is difficult to know how much weight to give 
to appellate reversal rates in evaluating the Eastern District’s 
performance, given the existence of significant selection effects regarding 
the cases that reach final decision and are appealed.147  More importantly, 
141 Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form & Substance in Claim 
Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 358 (2007). 
142 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
143 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form 
& Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 362 (2007). 
144 Phillips was issued, and Texas Digital renounced and Vitronics reaffirmed, on 
July 12, 2005.  My study started with January 1, 2006 to allow district courts to adjust 
to Phillips.  Citations were calculated via Westlaw by entering the citation for each 
decision; clicking on the “Citing References” function; limiting to cases; limiting to Jan. 
1, 2006-Dec. 31, 2013; limiting to district courts; limiting by “hide negative.”  For each 
decision, citations were then limited just to E.D. Tex and again limited to hide negative. 
Nationwide, there were 2832 cites to Phillips, 1995 cites to Vitronics, and 328 cites to 
Texas Digital.  In the Eastern District of Texas, there were 437 cites to Phillips, 312 
cites to Vitronics, and 107 cites to Texas Digital. 
145 According to Lex Machina, 16.7% of claim construction orders from 2006-2013 
were from the Eastern District of Texas.  15.4% of non-negative citations to Phillips and 
15.6% of non-negative citations to Vitronics were from the Eastern District, but 32.6% 
of non-negative citations to Texas Digital were from the Eastern District.  See id.  
146 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
68, 70 (2013). 
147 For example, the Eastern District of Texas grants summary judgment at 
approximately one-fourth the rate of other districts.  This means that obtaining an 
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even if the Eastern District of Texas has not skewed claim construction in a 
pro-patentee direction in the past – perhaps because of the threat of 
reversal under de novo review – deferential review after Teva gives it 
greater opportunity and incentive to do so in the future. 
Thus, deferential review of claim construction is unlikely to reduce 
uncertainty in a way that will affect patent assertion entities.  By contrast, 
it is likely to increase use of patent-assertion-entity friendly general 
meaning approach, as well as increase the power and importance of the 
district courts most favorable to patent assertion entities.  Overall, 
deferential review of claim construction is good news for patent assertion 
entities.  Unsurprisingly, the nation’s leading technology companies (again, 
the most popular target of patent assertion entities) bucked conventional 
wisdom in recent years and argued for retention of the Federal Circuit’s de 
novo review standard.148 
2. How Current Trends Benefit Patent Assertion Entities
Claim construction is undoubtedly moving in favor of more 
deferential appellate review.  Again, this trend is out of step with general 
concerns about the effect of patent assertion entities on the patent system. 
In Teva v. Sandoz, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
de novo standard of review, holding instead that some measure of 
deference was appropriate in reviewing district court claim construction 
decisions.  Specifically, the Court held that a district court’s “subsidiary 
factual findings about th[e] extrinsic evidence . . . must be reviewed for 
clear error on appeal,” though the Federal Circuit should “still review the 
district court's ultimate construction of the claim de novo.”149  “On its face, 
Teva v. Sandoz unquestionably altered the standard of review for claim 
construction, shifting it towards greater deference to the district courts.”150  
Commentators generally have praised the Supreme Court’s adoption of 
more deferential claim construction review.151  Some commentators even 
appealable final decision in the Eastern District is more likely to require incurring the 
entire expense and risk of trial.  Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857. 
148 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015); Brief for Intel Corp. et 
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015); Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellant, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 
F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
149 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2015) 
150 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD 
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 10). 
151 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in 
Patent Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 187 (2015); Jason Rantanen, 
Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD TECH. L.J. __ (2015). 
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have criticized the Federal Circuit for not vigorously implementing 
deferential review post-Teva and urged an expansive reading of the 
deferential review required by Teva.152   
III. LESSONS FROM THE INTERSECTION OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND
PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES 
This Part turns from the descriptive to the normative.  Part II 
described the overlooked connection between claim construction and patent 
assertion entities, as well as how patent assertion entities benefit from 
problems and trends in claim construction doctrine.  This Part addresses 
what this descriptive account means for the patent system.  
A.  If You Care About Patent Assertion Entities, You Should Care 
About Claim Construction 
A sometimes fierce debate exists within the patent community as to 
whether patent assertion entities are good, bad, or neutral for the patent 
system.153  This Essay does not take sides in that debate.  Regardless of 
one’s views of patent assertion entities, it is useful to recognize the 
connection to claim construction issues and trends. 
For those who believe that concerns about patent assertion entities 
are overblown or that patent assertion entities play a beneficial role in the 
patent system, this Essay will probably be of little import.  Hopefully, they 
will find the descriptive account interesting and recognition of the 
relationship between claim construction doctrine and patent assertion 
entities useful.  However, they will be undisturbed by the fact that the 
issues and trends in claim construction help patent assertion entities, 
though perhaps (as I do154) they will find the issues and trends in claim 
construction problematic in their own right.   
On the other hand, for the majority of the patent community 
concerned (to some extent) about patent assertion entities, this Essay 
should serve as a wake-up call.  Problems with claim construction are 
generally ignored in debates and reforms related to patent assertion 
entities.  If anything, claim construction is treated as a solution, not a 
cause, of the “patent troll problem.”155  This Essay suggests that claim 
152 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD 
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 18-22). 
153 See Part I.A, supra. 
154 See Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1353 (2014); Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An 
Ordinary Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243 (2014); Greg 
Reilly, Improvidently Granted:  Why the Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong Claim 
Construction Issue for En Banc Review, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43 (2013). 
155 See Part I.C, supra. 
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construction problems contribute to the effectiveness of patent assertion 
entities.  More troubling, claim construction doctrine and commentary is 
moving in a direction that favors patent assertion entities.  If patent 
assertion entities are as problematic as many in the patent community 
believe, then it is important to address the underlying problems of claim 
construction and reconsider the direction in which claim construction is 
moving.  Those in the crosshairs of patent assertion entities – the nation’s 
leading technology companies – seem to have reached this very 
conclusion.156 
This Essay also contributes to debates over claim construction.  At 
times, claim construction feels as if it is in a time warp, with the battle 
lines and arguments drawn in the early 2000s and little changed in the 
intervening years, despite significant changes in the patent litigation 
landscape.  Claim construction is the one area immune from analysis about 
how the rise of patent assertion entities over the past decade has changed 
the patent landscape.  Likewise, the dramatic concentration of patent cases 
in the Eastern District of Texas over the past decade plays little part in 
claim construction discussions.  Commentators praise recent developments 
in claim construction, like the Teva decision, even as they acknowledge 
that the success of these developments depend on faithful implementation 
by district judges.157  Whether this will occur is questionable in the current 
patent litigation landscape, where approaching half of all patent cases are 
filed in a single district exactly because that district has consistently 
applied the law in a way to favor patentees, including patent assertion 
entities.158   
Those debating claim construction issues would be well-advised to 
consider the consequences for patent assertion entities of various 
approaches to claim construction.  Some may believe that trends in claim 
156 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant 4, Lighting 
Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en 
banc) (“[T]he root causes of uncertainty in claim construction are vaguely drafted claims 
and contradictory claim-construction methodologies, not appellate review. Deference 
would not ameliorate those causes of uncertainty; it would make them worse. Deference 
would . . . incentivize [district judges] to rely more on the extrinsic evidence presented 
in any given case, and less on what a patent actually says, in hopes of securing greater 
deference.”). 
157 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in 
Patent Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 187, 197-199 (2015).  To be fair, 
in other work, Professors Anderson and Menell recognize (but dismiss) the relationship 
of deferential review of claim construction and “renegade” districts like the Eastern 
District of Texas.  J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An 
Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW.
U. L. REV. 1, 68, 70 (2013) 
158 See Part II.C.1, supra; see also J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent 
Cases, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 631(2015); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum 
Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857.    
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construction rules, like deferential review and the general meaning 
approach, are warranted despite (or except for) the positive effect for 
patent assertion entities.  That certainly could be true, though I have 
previously doubted it.159  Regardless, the consequences for patent assertion 
entities are a cost of these trends that should be weighed in any cost-
benefit analysis of claim construction rules. 
This is not to say that claim construction doctrine should be applied 
differently in cases brought by patent assertion entities or designed in a 
particular way solely to combat patent assertion entities.  Rather, I agree 
with Professor Lemley and Douglas Melamed that “[p]atent trolls alone are 
not the problem; they are a symptom of larger problems with the patent 
system.”160  This Essay builds on their work.  That patent assertion entities 
thrive under current claim construction doctrine and trends suggests that 
claim construction is one of those “larger problems” of which patent 
assertion entities are a “symptom.”  As Lemley and Melamed conclude, 
“[e]xposing the larger problems allows us to contemplate changes in patent 
law that will actually tackle the underlying pathologies of the patent 
system and the abusive conduct they enable.”161  There is a need to 
reconsider claim construction rules and trends not simply because they 
help patent assertion entities but because this effect suggests claim 
construction doctrine is problematic in its own right. 
To be clear, this Essay only argues that reversing current trends in 
claim construction could help address the success and influence of patent 
assertion entities, not that it is the only way of doing so.  It is possible that 
other patent reforms will successfully combat patent assertion entities, 
without the need for any changes to the general doctrine or trends in claim 
construction.  For example, perhaps venue reform that limits the ability to 
file in the Eastern District of Texas will undermine patent assertion 
entities.162   
Similarly, Professor Lemley’s suggestion for limiting software 
functional claiming could be sufficient to address patent assertion entities. 
159 See Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1353 (2014); Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An 
Ordinary Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243 (2014); Greg 
Reilly, Improvidently Granted:  Why the Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong Claim 
Construction Issue for En Banc Review, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43 (2013). 
160 Mark A. Lemley & Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forests for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121 (2013). 
161 Mark A. Lemley & Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forests for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121 (2013) 
162 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
68, 70 (2013) (arguing that venue is a better tool “to address concerns about districts 
seeking to attract patent cases” than de novo review of claim construction). 
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Over half of patent assertion entity cases involve software patents,163 and 
estimates are that 100% of the software claims asserted by patent 
assertion entities use functional claim language.164  To some extent, 
Professor Lemley’s proposal is consistent with the analysis in this Essay. 
This Essay suggests that persistent split in the Federal Circuit’s claim 
construction precedent and the continued vitality of the general meaning 
approach to claim construction are significant factors in the uncertainty 
and overbreadth of claim scope on which patent assertion entities rely.165  
Professor Lemley would create special rules for interpreting software 
functional claims that are more consistent with the patent-focused 
approach than the general meaning approach.  Doing so would mitigate the 
problems created by the persistence of both the claim construction split 
generally and the general meaning approach specifically, perhaps 
sufficiently to severely undermine patent assertion entities’ prospects of 
success.   
For several reasons, however, it is still important to recognize the 
connection between general claim construction problems and patent 
assertion entities.  First, approximately 40% of patent assertion entity 
cases do not involve functional software claims and would be unaffected by 
Professor Lemley’s proposal.166  Second, although the en banc Federal 
Circuit recently expanded the circumstances in which claims will be 
deemed so-called “means-plus-function” claims that are limited to the 
corresponding structure disclosed in the specification,167 Professor Lemley’s 
broader proposal to limit all functional claims to the means disclosed for 
performing the function disclosed in the specification has not been adopted. 
Third, even if Professor Lemley’s proposal were adopted, the line between 
functional and non-functional claims is murky.  Skilled claim drafters are 
likely to find creative ways to write claims that are the equivalent of 
functional claims while avoiding the “functional” label and the special 
claim construction rules that would come with it. 
B.  Claim Construction Problems Undermine Other Efforts to 
Combat Patent Assertion Entities 
To this point, I have focused on how the problems and trends in 
claim construction directly benefit patent assertion entities.  But claim 
construction doctrine is relevant to the debate over patent assertion 
163 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, 
26, 29 (Winter 2011-2012) (finding 62% of patents asserted in patent assertion entity 
cases were software patents). 
164 Mark A. Lemley, Functional Claiming, 2013 WISCONSIN L. REV. 905, 920 n.65. 
165 See Part II.A, B., supra. 
166 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, 
26, 29 (Winter 2011-2012). 
167 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, No. 2013-1130 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015) (en 
banc in relevant part). 
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entities for another, indirect reason.  The problems and trends in claim 
construction undermine the effectiveness of many of the leading proposals 
to combat patent assertion entities. 
Most proposals to combat patent assertion entities are motivated by 
the belief that patent assertion entities bring weak claims and that 
mechanisms are needed to deter or weed out these weak claims.  Proposals 
abound, including heightened pleading requirements, fee shifting, and Rule 
11 sanctions.168  These proposals generally require a determination that 
the claim lacked merit when brought.  This is obviously true of heightened 
pleading requirements.  It also true of Rule 11 sanctions, which require the 
contentions in the complaint to have factual and legal support at the time 
the attorney signs and files the complaint.169  Likewise, proposals that 
would require the non-prevailing party to pay the attorneys’ fees of the 
prevailing party would excuse fee shifting if “the position and conduct of 
the non-prevailing party or parties were reasonably justified in law and 
fact,” or something significantly equivalent.170   
However, under the current state of claim construction, 
requirements like “reasonably justified” and “plausible” are very low 
thresholds for the patentee to pass.  An issued patent benefits from the 
statutory presumption of validity, which likely is sufficient for a plaintiff to 
be “reasonably justified” or “plausible” in believing the patent is not 
invalid.  Claim construction is often decisive or determinative as to the 
infringement question.171  In light of the issues with claim construction 
discussed above, how difficult is it really for a patentee to identify a 
“reasonably justified” or “plausible” claim construction (and therefore 
infringement) position?172  The patentee has two equally valid claim 
construction methodologies from which to choose, methodologies that result 
in differing claim scope.  As a result of the continued vitality of the general 
meaning approach, the patentee need only be able to find a dictionary, 
scientific text, or paid expert willing to support its claim construction 
position in order for it to be “reasonably justified” and “plausible.” 
168 H.R. 9, 114th Cong., 1st Session, at 6 (as introduced in the House, Feb. 5, 2015) 
(providing for heightened pleading requirements and fee shifting); Eric Rogers & Young 
Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolls: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11, 12 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 291 (2014) (proposing greater use of Rule 11 sanctions). 
169 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). 
170 H.R. 9, 114th Cong., 1st Session, at 6 (as introduced in the House, Feb. 5, 2015). 
171 See Part I.B.1, supra. 
172 Eric Rogers & Young Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolls: A New Approach for 
Applying Rule 11, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 291, 319 (2014) (noting that “any 
independent, good-faith construction” and any construction that is “not frivolous” would 
bar Rule 11 sanctions); but see Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerCrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306 
(2013) (finding case exceptional for purposes of fee shifting because “the written 
description provides no support for Taurus’s unreasonably broad construction”). 
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Due to the uncertainty and breadth of potential claim scope under 
current claim construction doctrine, the patentee will fairly easily be able 
to state a plausible, good faith claim at the time of filing.  Thus, efforts to 
address the patent assertion entity “problem” that rely on identifying 
claims that lack merit at the time of filing may prove ineffective.173   
CONCLUSION 
For too long, the vigorous debates over patent assertion entities and 
claim construction have operated independent of each other.  Current 
problems and trends in claim construction have important consequences 
for debates over patent assertion entities, as they tend to help the litigation 
position of patent assertion entities.  Those concerned about patent 
assertion entities would be well-advised to reconsider the direction that 
claim construction is moving.  Those concerned about claim construction 
would be well-advised to consider the consequences of various claim 
construction rules for patent assertion entities.  This Essay contributes to 
both the debates over patent assertion entities and the debates over claim 
construction by recognizing the important, but overlooked, links between 
claim construction and patent assertion entities. 
173 Cf. Shubha Ghosh, Fee Shifting as Policy Lever: How to Ensure Sufficient 
Torque, PATENTLYO (May 19, 2015), available at 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/05/shifting-policy-sufficient.html (suggesting that fee 
shifting may only be effective if mandatory, not subject to factors like a party’s litigation 
position). 
